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This study was intended to develop an understanding of producer preference for land-based 
carbon sequestration in agriculture.  We conducted a mail survey to elicit producer choice to 
provide marketable carbon offsets by participating in different carbon credit programs 
characterized by varying practices.  Based on a quantitative analysis, we found that: 1) the 
market price for carbon offsets could increase producer participation in carbon sequestration; 2) 
producers perceived differentially different but correlated private costs for adopting carbon 
sequestering practices, depending on production attributes; and 3) relatively high carbon prices 
would be needed to stimulate producer provision of carbon offsets by land-based carbon 
sequestration activities.  A simulation of producer choice with agricultural census data estimated 
potential carbon offsets supply in the Northern Great Plains region.  This study contributes to the 
economic understanding of agricultural potential for greenhouse gas mitigation.       
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I.  Introduction 
As agricultural land-based carbon sequestration represents an important option in the portfolio of 
climate change mitigation strategies (McCarl and Sands 2007, NRC 2010), understanding 
producer preference for on-farm carbon sequestration activities are critically important.  Carbon 
sequestration is a new concept for producers.  Land-based activities to provide marketable 
carbon offsets represent a new farm opportunity with which most producers have no experience.  
On the other hand, agricultural producers are risk-averse and this risk attitude has historically 
negatively affected commodity supply in the agricultural market (e.g., Chavas and Holt 1996).  
With an emerging market for greenhouse gas (GHG) emission offsets, a realistic question is how 
producers would respond to the carbon sequestration potential on their farmland.  Producer 
preference for available carbon-sequestering practices apparently would affect carbon offsets 
supply and economic assessment of agricultural potential in climate change mitigation.   
Economic studies have arisen attempting to estimate agricultural carbon sequestration 
potential using different approaches.  For example, a group of studies mostly focused on 
forestation explicitly considered producer revealed preferences in land use and management 
decision to estimate the potential carbon sequestration supply under different policies (Stavins 
1999, Newell and Stavins 2000, Lubowski et al. 2006).  Based on a farm production survey, 
Antle et al. (2001) estimated and used the producer decision model combined with biophysical 
simulation to assess economic potential for agricultural carbon sequestration.  Another group of 
studies examined carbon sequestration along with a set of other GHG mitigation strategies in the 
U.S. agricultural sector in a competitive equilibrium framework (e.g., Lewandrowki et al. 2004, 
Schneider et al. 2007).  While these studies found that agricultural carbon sequestration could be 
competitive with other GHG mitigation options, little is known about the preference of producers 
who manage farmland with their own production decision.   2 
 
This study was motivated to develop an understanding of producer preference for carbon 
sequestration opportunities on agricultural lands.  It was intended to reveal producer preferences 
by focusing on producer behavior in a hypothetical market for carbon offsets.  This study 
attempted to explore: 1) what effect the market price for carbon offsets would have on producer 
adoption of practices that could sequester carbon in soils and biomass; 2) to what extent producer 
decision to adopt different carbon-sequestering practices could be linked to their costs as 
perceived by producers that could be stratified by producer production attributes; and 3) how 
producer preference interacts between carbon sequestration activities and varies by producer.  An 
examination of the three questions is potentially useful for developing economic appraisal for 
land-based carbon sequestration in agriculture.  
In this study, we conducted a mail survey to elicit producer willingness to provide 
marketable carbon offsets at a given price by participating in different carbon credit programs 
characterized by varying practices.  We used producer stated preference to calibrate a behavior 
model that quantitatively linked producer carbon program choice to potential carbon revenues 
and perceived costs for program participation stratified by the production attributes of the 
producer.  Based on the Bayesian method, we identified the producer behavior model and 
preference variations by producer and by carbon program.  We applied the producer behavior 
model combined with agricultural census data to simulating potential agricultural supply of 
carbon emission offsets by land-based carbon sequestration in the Northern Great Plains (NGP) 
region.         
This study is of policy interest.  As the science community has identified GHG emissions 
reduction as a core element to shape policy-making in America’s climate choices (NRC 2010), a 
comprehensive, strategic action plan with a portfolio of GHG mitigation activities is needed to 
effectively combat climate change.  Previous studies have established that agricultural land-
based carbon sequestration could serve as a low-cost strategy bridging to future climate change 
mitigation.  Yet, adoption of carbon-sequestering activities depends critically on the decisions of 
producers who manage agricultural land.  Producers may perceive differently than non-producers 
on the potential benefit and cost of sequestering carbon by various land-based practices.  
Producer perception on and preference for carbon sequestration might depend on production 
attributes while being heterogeneous by person and by activity.  Understanding producer 3 
 
preferences and potential response would inform policy design in developing a cost-effective, 
implementable action plan to mitigate climate change.   
In addition, possible energy and climate change legislation by the U.S. Congress has 
raised concern on the potential cost impact of GHG emissions regulation on agriculture (AFBF 
2010).  If regulating and reducing GHG emissions represent an inevitable political choice for the 
U.S., agriculture ultimately needs to adjust to government climate policy by identifying 
opportunities to mitigate the cost impacts of GHG regulation.  While providing marketable GHG 
emissions offsets might represent such an opportunity to which the agricultural sector should pay 
close attention, understanding producer preferences has important implication for government 
policy to facilitate and promote agricultural participation in climate change mitigation.    
  This paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 summarizes producer preference survey 
including survey design and producer response.  Section 3 describes our modeling method to 
analyze producer stated preferences.  Section 4 estimates and compares alternative specifications 
for the producer behavior model.  Section 5 applies the estimated producer behavior model to 
simulating acreage enrollment in different carbon sequestration activities and potential supply of 
carbon emission offsets in the NGP region.  Section 6 concludes the paper with some discussion.         
 
II.  Producer Preference Survey  
Our survey questionnaire was composed of three sections designed to explore potential linkage 
between producer preference for carbon sequestration and production attributes.  Section 1 was 
intended to elicit producer choice to adopt different practices to provide carbon emission offsets 
in a hypothetical market.  This section first described available carbon credit programs 
characterized by different practices that producers could choose to adopt to participate in these 
programs.  In the survey, we presented four carbon programs, which were adopted from the 
voluntary carbon programs administrated by the National Farmers Union (NFU) that collects and 
sells carbon credits in the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX) (NFU 2009).  These programs 
included conservation tillage, cropland conversion to grass, rangeland management, and tree 
planting.  For each program, we listed available carbon credits that could be claimed for payment 
on a per acre basis by enrolled producers with required practices.  Given the market price for 4 
 
carbon offsets, we calculated in the survey the expected payment per acre for participating in 
each program (see Table 1 for an example).    
In section 1, we asked two types of questions.  These questions served to separate a small 
group of producers currently in the voluntary carbon programs from the majority who were not.   
For each group, a different set of close-ended questions was raised to elicit producer choice of 
carbon credit programs for participation.  Section 2 contained questions to collect information on 
producer socio-economic background and their attitude to climate change and polity.  In section 
3, questions were raised on producer current production practices, such as land use, acreages, and 
tillage practice.  Data collected by sections 2 and 3 altogether defined the production attributes of 
each producer.   
  The survey was administered by the USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service 
(NASS) field office in North Dakota (ND).  We designed six different versions of survey 
questionnaires to incorporate different levels of the market price for carbon offsets ranging from 
$5 to $70 per metric ton of carbon (and thus varying profitability for carbon program 
participation).  For each version of the questionnaire, a sample of 500 producers across ND was 
randomly selected from the USDA NASS database to receive the survey.  Survey questionnaires 
were mailed out on January 15, 2010, followed by a postcard reminder after two weeks.  A total 
of 316 questionnaires were returned, among which 35 were not filled out and the remaining 281 
had at least one question answered.        
  Table 2 summarizes the survey response.  As shown by Table 2, the carbon price in the 
returned questionnaire ranged from $5 to $70 per metric ton of carbon and seemed to be 
correlated somehow with survey return rates.  For example, the carbon price at $70 per metric 
ton was associated with the highest return rate of 20%, which was in contrast to the lowest return 
rate of 14% when the price dropped to $5 per metric ton.  While the difference in the survey 
return rate between the highest and lowest carbon prices might motivate the hypothesis that a 
higher carbon price caused more attention and thus increased survey response, no similar trends 
were found for the price range of $15-50 per metric ton of carbon.   
Producers currently in the voluntary carbon credit program were rare.  Table 2 indicates 
that only about 7% of the producers who returned their questionnaires were in the voluntary 5 
 
carbon programs.  Excluding those producers, less than half were willing to participate in the 
carbon programs for their given carbon prices, with the majority (or 26%) considering 
conservation tillage followed by 20% in cropland conversion to grass and 19% in rangeland 
management.  Tree planting had the smallest portion of the producers at 12%.      
Producers typically were in their middle ages.  Nearly half of them were between 46 and 
59 years old, around one third over 60.  Most (or 72%) producers had more than 20 years of 
production experience.  Sixty percent of the producers indicated agricultural production being 
the major source of household income.  Around 40% had 4 years of college or some college 
education with the rest being evenly distributed among high school or less, technical training 
beyond high school, and graduate degree or coursework.  Producer attitude was divided between 
climate change and climate mitigation legislation.  While 44% were concerned about climate 
change, only 18% would support government climate legislation.   
Producer land tenure varied by farmland type.  Eighty fiver percent owned cropland and 
58% owned rangeland.  The percentages for renting cropland and rangeland were 50% and 31%, 
respectively.  It is worth noting that the categories of land ownership by farmland type may not 
be mutually exclusive.  A producer who owns cropland and/or rangeland may also rent cropland 
and/or rangeland at the same time.  The survey response confirmed this possibility.   
We grouped producers into four categories by how they used their land, including crop 
farming, land in CRP, rangeland management, and rental.  These land use categories can overlap 
as producers may have land allocated in one or more uses.  As demonstrated by Table 2, land use 
was unevenly distributed among the four categories.  Crop farming accounted for the highest 
percentage of 67% as a single land use type, which was followed by rangeland management at 
59% and land in the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) at 43%.  Accounting for 26% of the 
producers, farmland rental was the category with the lowest percentage.   
 
III.  Modeling Method 
In the survey, each producer was presented with 4 carbon credit programs from which they could 
choose any or all 4 programs at most to participate in or not participating at all.  The choice 6 
 
situation was characterized by multiple rather than single, mutually exclusive choice for each 
producer.  Table 3 characterizes the distribution of producer stated choice by carbon programs 
and the number of programs selected.  While different approaches could be used to model the 
potentially multiple choices of each producer, we consider each producer making participation 
decision on one carbon program at a time.  By this approach, each producer faced 4 choice 
situations and in each situation he decided participating or not participating in a specific carbon 
program.  The choices that each producer made for the 4 carbon programs were likely to be 
correlated with each other.           
Consider a producer j’s carbon program choice.  Denote Uij = Vij +  ij as producer j’s 
utility from participating in a carbon program i, where Vij is the average utility that producer j 
may expect to derive from the carbon program i, and  ij is the difference between the expected 
average utility Vij and the producer j’s individual utility.  This difference is unobservable and 
may be regarded as a random variable reflecting the variation of producer j individual taste.  
Without losing generality, we standardize producer j’s utility for not participating in carbon 
program i to be zero to represent the status quo.  Based on the random utility theory, the 
probability of producer j to participate in carbon program i can be formulated as 
), , ( Pr ) 0 ( Pr ) 1 ( Pr
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where yij is a choice variable with 1 indicating producer j’s participation in carbon program i and 
0 otherwise, I represents the set of available carbon programs, and h indicate a specific carbon 
program in I.  Note that the probability of producer j to select program i for carbon sequestration 
is expressed as a conditional probability to account for possible correlation among producer j’s 
choices with respect to all 4 carbon programs.   
  The probability of producer j’s choice for carbon program i, either participating or not 
participating, can be expressed as    
) 1 ( )] ( Pr 1 [ )] ( [Pr ) ( Pr
ij ij y
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Denote Yj = [y1j, y2j, y3j, y4j]’ as producer j’s choice set regarding all 4 carbon programs.  The 
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Correspondingly, the log-likelihood function of all producer stated choices would be 
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Once a proper distribution is specified for   with V parameterized as a function of observable 
variables X and preference parameters   to be estimated, the probability Pr(∙) ( (∙)>V(∙)) of a 
producer participation choice on each carbon program can be numerically or analytically 
calculated.  The preference parameters   can then be estimated by maximizing the log-likelihood 
function (4).   
In the conditional logit model,   is assumed following the extreme value distribution.  If 
this assumption holds true, then the probability of producer j to participate in carbon program i 
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However, to account for possibly correlated producer choices among carbon programs requires 
either correlated   or a structure in the expected average utility V that allows correlated utility U 
among carbon programs for individual producers.   Consequently, to maintain the logistic 
function representing producer choice probability with independently distributed   then dictates 
correlated expected average utility V.   
  To parameterize the producer utility function with the required property while linking 
producer choice to production attributes in an economically meaningful way, we consider 
producer decision on carbon program participation in a profit-maximizing framework.  Denote 
ij as the marginal profit that would result to producer j’s income from participation in carbon 
program i.  We introduce a utility function to link producer j’s participation choice for carbon 
program i to the marginal profits  ij such that   8 
 
ij ij ij ij V U ) (           (6) 
With an active carbon offsets market, producer j’s total profit from producing both agricultural 
commodities and carbon offsets by participating in carbon program i may be expressed as  
) , ( ) ( ij ij ij ij c ij ij ij q C q p q Q PQ         (7)   
where P represents a vector of market prices for agricultural commodities, Qij denotes a vector of 
production outputs for these commodities, qij denotes the amount of carbon offsets produced by 
adopting the practice required by carbon program i, and Cij(Qij, qij) is the production cost for 
commodity output Qij with carbon offsets yield qij, and pc is the market price for carbon offsets.  
Because producing carbon offsets by participating in carbon program i requires changing 
practices or land use, the production outputs of commodities Qij and their production cost Cij 
may be indirectly affected by carbon offsets yield qij.   
For profit-maximizing producers to provide carbon offsets (i.e., qij > 0), the Kuhn-Tucker 
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Q as the production cost increment attributed to the commodity output effect of 
changing production practice required by carbon program i and  Cij
q as the cost increment 
directly linked to the program participation.  For a positive carbon yield  qij > 0, the Kuhn-
Tucker condition (8) in discrete case can be written as  
ij = pc qij – [–(P Qij –  Cij
Q) +  Cij
q] > 0     (9) 
The expression (9) indicates that profit-maximizing producers will participate in carbon program 
i if the marginal revenue from adopting the required practice is greater than its marginal cost 
including both the opportunity cost of commodity production and the direct cost of the practice.  
This condition establishes our modeling framework for specifying and estimating an econometric 
producer behavior model on carbon program participation once producer preference is known.     9 
 
Denote  ij = [–(P Qij –  Cij
Q) +  Cij
q] and Rij = pc qij.  Consequently,  ij = Rij –  ij.  
While producer j decides whether or not to participate in carbon program i based on his 
evaluation of the marginal profit  ij, the producer j perceived  ij, particularly the marginal cost 
ij, in general is not observed or unavailable.  In the discrete choice modeling framework, 
however, only the differences of these marginal costs (or profits) among carbon programs matter 
to modeling producer choice, and thus it is not necessary to measure the absolute value of  E(∙) 
or  ij if Rij is known.  As the producer private costs  E(∙) depends on the opportunity costs in 
addition to the program-specific costs, both of which are affected by producer current production  
practices, we introduce an index function to stratify and parameterize  (∙) for adopting required 
carbon sequestering practices by production attributes such that:   
ij j ij ij E E ) (J            (10)   
where Jj is a vector of producer j observable production attributes,  ) ( j ij E J represents the 
private cost for participating in carbon program i expected by producer j with production 
attributes Jj, and  ij is a random error in measuring the private cost.  We assume that producer 
attributes J can characterize and stratify producer costs for adopting different carbon-
sequestering practices so as to lead to different choices by producers among carbon programs.  
The production attribute J may include land use, production practices, land ownership, 
demographics, and attitude to climate change and policy.   
Substituting  (∙) and  ij into the utility function yields 
ij ij j ij ij ij E R V U ) ), ( , ( J        (11) 
While there is no reason to expect those private cost deviations  (∙) to be independently 
distributed across carbon programs, it is likely that  (∙) is correlated with each other across 
carbon programs for each producer.  In other words, a producer who perceives a high cost for, 
say, converting cropland to grass to provide carbon offsets, might also assign a high cost for 
planting tree for the same purpose although it might not always be the case.  The introduction of 
the index function of producer costs  ij with correlated  (∙) provides a structure allowing 10 
 
correlated utilities and thus choices among carbon programs while offering desirable 
interpretation on producer choice consistent with economic production theory.  
  To parameterize the utility function, we consider a specification with the following 
characteristics:  1) different producers perceive different costs and benefits for participating in a 
same carbon program; 2) a producer perceives different costs and benefits for participating in 
different carbon programs; and 3) these different producer perceptions are due to production 
attributes and may be correlated across carbon programs.  A desirable specification of the utility 
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Where Ii
k indicates the k element of the vector of observed attributes Ii that describes carbon 
program i, Jj
l indicates the l element of the vector of observed attributes Jj that describes 
producer j,  ij
kl is the corresponding coefficient parameter,  j is the vector of coefficient 
parameters for all available carbon programs for producer j,  (∙)j is the vector of coefficient 
parameters for a specific carbon program for producer j, and  (
0,  ) represents the distribution 
of  j with population mean 
0 and covariance matrix  .  Here, we use the random coefficient 
parameters  j to allow different producer perceptions for the costs and benefits depending on 
production attribute Jj.  These parameters are jointly distributed with a general variance-
covariance matrix   that may accommodate correlated expected utilities (and thus choices) 
across the choice situations faced by individual producers.  This specification leads to the mixed 
logit model of producer carbon program choice instead of the conditional logit model that is no 
longer appropriate by assuming independent producer choices across carbon programs.    
Given preference parameters vector  j and observed variables matrix Xj = [X1j, X2j, X3j, 
X4j]’ = [I1jJj’, I2jJj’, I3jJj’, I4jJj’]’ representing producer j’s attributes interacted with carbon 
programs, the probability of producer j’s choice Yj would be 
4
1
) 1 ( )] , ( Pr 1 [ )] , ( [Pr ) , ( Pr
i
y
j j ij ij
y
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  (13) 
The population mean or unconditional probability of producer j’s choice would be 11 
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where f( j
0,  ) represents the probability distribution of preference parameters  j.  
Consequently, the log-likelihood function of all producer choices with respect to carbon credit 
programs would be 
1
0 ) , , ( Pr ln
j
j j j LL Ω β X Y
       (15)
 
With the joint distribution of random parameters specified, the distributional parameters of 
producer preferences theoretically can be estimated by maximizing the log-likelihood function 
(15).  The integration over the joint distribution of preference parameters (i.e., equation (15)) 
usually cannot be completed analytically with a closed form result.  Numeric method has to be 
used to approximate the unconditional choice probability of individual producers.        
In this study, we use the Bayesian approach with a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) 
simulation to identify the distributional parameters of producer preferences.  The foundation of 
the Bayesian approach is the Bayes rule P(B)P(A B) = P(A)P(B A), which summarizes the 
probabilistic relationship between two random variables A and B which may be used for statistic 
inferences.  In the classic Bayesian statistics, a probability distribution, say, P(B) is specified to 
characterize prior information on the unknown parameter B of a sampling process P(A B).  With 
a sample A generated by the sampling process P(A B), the prior distribution P(B) is modified 
and updated with a posterior distribution P(B A) = P(B) P(A B)/P(A) to reflect new information 
on the parameters B implied by the sample A.  The MCMC simulation as a sampling approach 
has gained popularity in Bayesian statistics for summarizing the posterior probability distribution 
(Gelfand and Smith 1990, Gelman 1995, Gilks 1996).  For the posterior distribution P(B A), a 
sample of the unknown parameters B can be generated by the MCMC simulation such that 
sample means and deviations can be calculated as the Bayesian estimation of B and standard 
errors in the classic statistics. 
In our mixed logit model, because producer preference parameters  (∙) ~ (
0,  ) is 
unknown, the unconditional choice probability Prj(Yj  Xj, 
0,  ) of producer j is used in the 
likelihood function  12 
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where g(Y) is the unconditional probability of Y, which is a constant not depending on 
0 and  .  
Although the MCMC simulation could be used to draw a sample of the population parameter 
based on the posterior distribution (17), the integration involved in the likelihood function to 
estimate the unconditional probabilities of individual producer choices would be burdensome.  
Following Train (2009), producer-specific preference parameter  (∙) is introduced along with its 
distribution parameters such that the conditional choice probability of individual producers rather 
than their unconditional choice probability is calculated with the integration no longer needed.  
Consequently, the new posterior distribution with producer-specific preference parameter  (∙) 
would be 
) , ( ) , ( ) ( ) , , (
0 0 0 0 1 Ω β Ω β β β Y Y β Ω β P f L P
    (18)
 
where   = { (∙)}.  This manipulation improves the feasibility and computational efficiency of the 
Bayesian approach with the MCMC simulation to estimating the mixed logit model, particularly 
when a large number of random parameters could be involved with varying distributions for 
individual parameters.      
The Bayesian estimation of the mixed logit model with the MCMC simulation can be 
conducted with Gibbs sampling (Train 2009).  Essentially, Gibbs sampling for the mixed logit 
model constructs a Markov chain by iteratively taking a draw from the posterior for each 
parameter conditional on the other parameters with their draws taken previously.  Once the 
conditional posterior of each parameter is derived, taking draws from them is straightforward.  It 
can be shown that the conditional posteriors of individual parameters for the joint posterior (18) 13 
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0
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1 N K N K N K IW P S E β β Ω , where N represents the normal 
distribution, IW represents the inverted Wishart distribution, K denotes the dimension of 
preference parameter vector  (∙), T indicates the sample size, E is an indentify matrix, and
T j j / )' )( ( b β b β S  is a matrix of standard deviations (Train 2009).  Note that the above 
conditional posteriors are based on the assumption of normally distributed preference parameters 
(∙) with population mean 
0, covariance matrix  , and a prior with extremely large variances for 
the parameters.  They may vary depending on the specific distributions assumed for the 
preference parameters  (∙).  Train (2009) provided a detailed guidance on the Bayesian estimation 
of mixed logit models using Gibbs sampling, including procedures for taking draws from the 
conditional posteriors based on different priors.   
 
IV.  Modeling Results 
We estimated and compared different choice models with varying specifications to identify the 
preference that best describes producer choice among carbon programs.  Models considered 
included conditional logit and mixed logit with different specifications on the producer utility 
function.  Table 4 compares these models by their structural characteristics, simulated log-
likelihood of producer choices, and in-sample choice prediction.  As the choice prediction could 
be different depending on its focus on either each choice or all the 4 choices of each producer, 
we calculated these two types of prediction for comparison.  The ideal producer choice model 
should have a large log-likelihood for producer choice, high sample prediction rates by producer 
and by choice, and theoretically sound, reasonable representation of producer preferences.         
In Table 4, Models 1-3 represent conditional logit models.  These models range from a 
simple specification of producer utility depending only on the attributes of carbon programs to a 
more sophisticated specification with interacted attributes between producers and carbon 
programs.  As demonstrated by Table 4, Model 2, which assumed similar producer perceptions 
on carbon revenue but different perceptions on the private costs of individual carbon programs 
depending on production attributes, performed better than Models 1 and 3 in terms of simulated 14 
 
log-likelihood and sample prediction by individual choice.  Although Model 1 performed the 
best in sample prediction, it had a poor fit with the sample data, which implied less effective 
representation of producer preferences and thus the out-of-sample prediction in future policy 
application would be less reliable.  The poor performance of Model 3 rejected the hypothesis that 
producers perceived carbon revenue differentially depending on their production attributes.   
Models 4-8 are mixed logit models.  The theoretical foundation for these models was 
heterogeneous producer preferences as represented by random rather than fixed coefficient 
parameters in the utility function.  By the Bayesian method with the MCMC sampling technique, 
both individual-level and population-level parameters of producer preferences can be estimated, 
a characteristics desirable particularly when there is no reason to expect a same preference 
structure for all producers.  For the mixed logit models, we calculated the two types of in-sample 
prediction using two different approaches: one by sampling preference parameters for individual 
producers; and the other by using population-level preference parameters.  Based on the 
population-level parameters (with corresponding predictions in parentheses in Table 3), all 
mixed logit models performed better than or at least comparable to the conditional logit models.  
The sampling-based choice prediction by mixed logit models was also comparable with that 
from the conditional logit, particularly by individual choice prediction.  
Overall, Model 6 performed reasonably well as compared to other models.  Models 8 and 
6 had the largest simulated log-likelihood, but Model 8 had the lowest prediction rate either by 
the sampling approach or on average by population parameters.  Models 4 and 6 were ranked the 
highest in sample prediction by the sampling approach.  Yet Model 4 had a simple preference 
structure with a poor data fitting, which raised serious concern on its ability to represent producer 
preferences and to conduct out-of-sample prediction.  Although Model 5 performed better in 
sample prediction by using population parameter, Models 6 had a better data fit with a larger log-
likelihood estimate and more accurate sample choice prediction by the sampling approach.   
It is worth noting that the only difference between Models 5 and 6 was the covariance 
matrix of the random parameters that were independent in Model 5 but correlated in Model 6.  
As the choices of each producer might be correlated among carbon programs, Model 6 seemed to 
better account for potentially correlated choices as demonstrated by its larger log-likelihood 
estimate.  This was consistent with Model 6 better performance in sample prediction by the 15 
 
sampling approach that allowed generation of correlated coefficient parameters.  This advantage, 
however, could not show up in sample prediction based on population level parameters as only 
one set of parameters was used such that the correlation among parameters became irrelevant.  
Based on the above comparison, we selected Model 6 as the best model that better fited the 
producer choice data with a desirable specification on the structure of producer preferences and 
their variation within population.       
Table 5 presents the estimated coefficient parameters for Model 6.  As expected, the 
potential revenue from carbon offsets provision could significantly increase the probability of 
producer participation in carbon programs.  The production attributes of producers did affect 
their perceived private costs for participating in carbon programs to provide carbon offsets, and 
the effects of the attributes varied across carbon programs.  In our model estimation, the 
producer attributes were measured by their deviations from the sample means.  Consequently, 
the coefficients for Constant interacted with the carbon program dummies would be interpreted 
as the perceived private costs for carbon programs of a representative producer with the sample 
“average” production attributes.  The insignificance of these coefficients suggests that: 1) the 
production attributes of producers accounted for the difference in their perceived costs for carbon 
program participation, and 2) the difference in the average perceived costs for carbon programs 
by the representative producer could not be rejected, a result consistent with the model 
specification that the population mean of producer perceived private costs for each carbon 
program depends on production attributes.        
The current land use practice of producers differentially affected their perceptions of the 
costs for participating in different carbon programs.  Crop farming was found to be associated 
with lower perceived costs for conservation tillage, cropland conversion to grass, and tree 
planting but a higher cost for rangeland management.  This may reflect the fact that crop farming 
makes more profits such that producers with more land in crop farming would be subject to some 
opportunity costs if they also devoted time to rangeland management to provide carbon offsets.  
CRP seemed to only affect the cost perception for tree planting, suggesting that a producer with 
CRP land would assign a lower cost than the sample average for planting tree.  This is consistent 
with the expectation that producers with marginal land might have lower opportunity costs for 
allocating land to trees to provide carbon offsets.  Rangeland reduced producer costs for 16 
 
participating in carbon programs, particularly for the program of rangeland management.  It is 
interesting to note the differential effects of the current land use on producer cost perception for a 
same carbon program.  For example, compared to crop farmers with the sample average 
production portfolio, producers managing more rangeland were associated with higher costs for 
conservation tillage, and vice versa for the program of rangeland management.     
As demonstrated by Table 4, land tenure had differential effects on producer cost 
perceptions for different carbon programs   significantly lower perceived costs for those 
programs that would require major changes on current land use, which would be less feasible if 
the potential participant had a weak control of the land.  This may be attributed to lower 
transaction costs or more flexibility for landowners to enroll their land in carbon programs with 
contracts.  Specifically, compared to the sample average, landowners assigned the lowest cost for 
tree planting followed by cropland conversion to grass, both of which would be more feasible 
with stronger land tenure.  In comparison, the estimated coefficients for Rent land, although not 
strongly significant, were negative for cropland to grass and tree planting, indicating higher 
perceived costs as compared to for conservation tillage that may be consistent with current land 
use without requiring major land use change and that seems not to be as critical in ownership 
requirement for program participation.  In addition, Own land had stronger effect in reducing the 
perceived cost for conservation tillage than did Rent land.  While Own land had similar effects 
on producer cost perceptions for conservation tillage and rangeland management, Rent land 
increased the cost for rangeland management but decreased the cost for conservation tillage.         
  Producer age tended to increase the perceived cost for conservation tillage and decrease 
the cost for cropland to grass.  In other words, the older the producer, the higher his cost for 
conservation tillage and the lower for cropland to grass.  A possible explanation is that 
conservation tillage requires changing machinery that may dictate a capital investment not worth 
its return, particularly for older producer s.  Indeed, quite a few survey respondents indicated that 
they were too old to consider expensive capital investment necessary for adopting conservation 
tillage.  In contrast, this was less of an issue for cropland to grass that could be more suitable for 
aged producers to participate in carbon sequestration without requiring as much investment in 
both capital and land management.   17 
 
Years of production experience seemed to affect the cost perception for rangeland 
management, with more experienced producers seeing less costs to earn carbon credits in this 
program.  College education and above marginally reduced producer perceived costs for tree 
planting but had no effect for other programs.  For producers concerned about climate change, a 
lower cost was perceived for cropland to grass, followed in turn by rangeland management and 
conservation tillage but perhaps a higher cost for tree planting.  For producers supporting a cap-
and-trade climate policy, lower costs were more likely to be assigned to conservation tillage, 
rangeland management, and tree planting but a higher cost to cropland to grass.  This may be 
attributed to the opportunity cost of converting cropland to grass that all other programs do not 
necessarily incur.  This result seems to suggest that climate policy supporters do not necessarily 
value all carbon programs and, in our sample, were more likely to participate in conservation 
tillage, rangeland management, and tree planting but less likely in cropland to grass.  
  One of the advantages of the mixed logit model is its ability to reveal the distribution of 
random coefficient parameters.  Figure 1 shows the distribution of the costs perceived by 
producers with the sample average attributes for adopting different carbon sequestering practices.  
The perceived costs for carbon program participation were negative for the majority of the 
producers.  On average, the perceived costs for different carbon programs followed the order 
conservation tillage < rangeland management < cropland to grass   tree planting.  This may 
reflect lower opportunity costs for both conservation tillage and rangeland management, both of 
which require no major land use change as compared to cropland to grass and tree planting.  
Figure 1 also shows that producer cost perceptions tended to be more concentrated for 
conservation tillage and rangeland management, a result probably attributed to their familiarity 
with both production practices.  In contrast, there was high variation in the perceived costs for 
cropland to grass and tree planting, which might be attributed to less familiarity or diverse 
impacting factors and thus a wide range of perceived costs, particularly for tree planting.           
  Table 5 reveals the correlation between the perceived costs for carbon programs by 
producers with the sample average attributes.  It shows that producer perceived costs were 
positively correlated with each other between different carbon programs.  Specifically, the cost 
for tree planting was more strongly correlated with that for conservation tillage and rangeland 
management than with that for cropland to grass.  This means that if a producer perceived a high 18 
 
cost for conservation tillage or rangeland management, he was more likely to also assign a high 
cost for tree planting than for cropland to grass.  Producer perceived costs for cropland to grass 
were more closely correlated with those for conservation tillage than with those for rangeland 
management and tree planting.  The existence of the correlation between producer perceived 
costs justifies our expectation of correlated producer stated choices between carbon programs 
and thus our model specification.    
 
V.  An Empirical Application  
The Bayesian method with the mixed logit model allows a sampling approach to simulating 
individual producer choices in adopting carbon sequestering practices.  To develop an 
application, we assume that U.S. climate policy has established national carbon credit programs 
similar to the programs modeled in this study, which provides payments at fixed rates for 
qualified carbon sequestration activities adopted by producers.  We apply the sampling-based 
choice simulating capacity combined with agricultural census data to estimating acreage 
enrollment in carbon credit programs by practice and carbon offsets supply in the NGP region.  
We assume that producer preference for adopting carbon sequestering practices is consistent 
between the NGP region and the ND State, an assumption justifiable by the delineation of the 
NGP region (USDA ERS 2010).  Our explicit consideration of the heterogeneity in both 
producer preferences and farm production characterized by county-level agricultural census data 
supports a more reliable simulation exercise.  
We first classify producers into different types by their production attributes vector J.  
We assume that agricultural production is homogeneous among producers of a same type with 
the same production attributes and heterogeneous across different producer types with varying 
production attributes.  Denote a(J) as the vector of farmland acreages in different land use 
operated by producers of type J.  With Pr(J, R) representing the vector of probabilities of 
participating in different carbon credit programs with potential carbon revenues R, the amounts 
of land in different use that producers of type J would enroll in carbon programs can be 
calculated as Pr(J, R)a(J) . 19 
 
In each county, there are many types of producers with varying production attributes 
vector J; and the distribution of producers by type differs across counties.  Suppose the 
probability distribution of producer type J in county w is Fw(J).  If the county w has a total 
number of Nw producers, the county-level acreages used to produce carbon offsets for carbon 
revenues R can be estimated as: 
J
J J a R J Pr w w w N F ) ( ) ( ) , (
        (19)
 
The regional total acreages of farmland enrolled in carbon credit programs would be 
w
w w w N F
J
J J a R J Pr ) ( ) ( ) , (
      (20)
 
If each acre of farmland in different carbon programs can sequester α metric ton of carbon, the 
regional total carbon offsets supply can be calculated as 
w
w w w N F
J
J J a R J Pr α ) ( ) ( ) , (
      (21)
 
           In this study, we consider five types of land use and management that cover the majority 
of farmland with carbon sequestration potential and that are incorporated in producer production 
attributes with available agricultural census data.  Not all land in their current use are equally 
qualified for the carbon credit programs.  While different assumptions can be made for the 
potentially available amount of land for each carbon program, we assume that producers enroll 
their land in a way by which they could reduce potential uncertainties and risks associated with 
programs and would not incur high opportunity costs.  As different carbon credit programs are 
targeted at different land use types and management practices, we assume that the considered 
carbon prices would not be sufficient to cause shifts among land use except for changes in 
management practices entailed by the target suitable carbon program.  Table 7 summarizes the 
2007 agricultural census data used in our simulation exercise for the NGP.   
Table 8 presents our simulation results on potential producer acreage enrollment in 
carbon programs and carbon offsets supply.  The total acreage in carbon programs would expand 
from around 28.9 million to 46 million when the carbon price rises from $5 to $70 per metric ton 20 
 
of carbon.  Rangeland management accounted for at least over 70% of the total enrolled land, 
which was in contrast with the second largest contribution of around 25% at best by conservation 
tillage.  This result may be attributed to the significance of rangeland in the region and its 
relatively low producer perceived costs for providing carbon offsets through better management.  
The other two carbon programs, cropland to grass and tree planting, contributed small portions of 
land in carbon offset provision, which were 3.3% and 1.2% at highest, respectively, for a carbon 
price of $70 per metric ton.     
The share of rangeland management in the total acreage enrollment decreased from 
approximately 87% to 70% with the rising carbon price.  The reduced percentage was balanced 
by the increased shares of the other three carbon programs, with the acreage contribution rising 
from approximately 13% to 26% for conservation tillage, from 0.3% to 3.3% for cropland to 
grass, and from 0.03% to 1.17% for tree planting.  The changing acreage distribution among 
carbon programs seems to suggest that producer program participation with rising carbon prices 
would be least responsive for rangeland management and most responsive for conservation 
tillage although all the carbon programs would see a growing enrollment.    
  The total supply of carbon offsets increased from 4.6 million metric ton to 10.7 million 
metric ton per year as the carbon price rose from $5 to $70 per metric ton of carbon.  
Corresponding to a relatively slow growth in land enrollment, the share of rangeland 
management also dropped from around 65% to 36%.  Both cropland to grass and tree planting 
played an increasing role in the supply of carbon offsets with their shares rising from 2% to 14% 
and from 0.3% to 6.2%, respectively.  Conservation tillage still was one major contributor to the 
carbon offsets supply.  Indeed, with its share increasing from 33% to 44%, conservation tillage 
surpassed rangeland management for a carbon price over $60, becoming the largest offset 
contributor.         
  In all, both conservation tillage and rangeland management seemed to be the major 
source of potential carbon offset supply in the region, particularly when carbon prices were 
relatively low.  Although both program sequesters less carbon than tree planting does on a per 
acre basis, their significance in carbon offsets supply may be attributed to the fact that they could 
be applied to the majority of farmland in the region in their current use without incurring 
significant opportunity costs.  The acreage available for planting tree and conversion to grass 21 
 
might be limited due to opportunity costs, conversion costs, uncertainties in carbon markets, or 
the loss of option value.  Yet a rising carbon price seemed to have stronger effect on land 
enrollment for both programs as compared to for rangeland management.  The relatively large 
amount of carbon that could potentially be sequestered in tree and biomass made tree planting 
and cropland conversion to grass also significant options for carbon offsets provision, 
particularly when the carbon price reached a high level.      
 
VI.  Conclusion 
In this study, we explored producer preference for land-based carbon sequestration potential on 
agricultural lands.  Based on producer stated choice among carbon programs in a hypothetical 
carbon market, our analysis found that producers would respond to the revenue from carbon 
sequestration, a result consistent with previous studies assuming responsive producer behavior to 
the carbon sequestration opportunity.  Higher market prices for carbon offsets increased the 
probability of producer participation in carbon sequestration.  However, within our modeling 
framework, we also found that producers perceived high private costs relative to the perceived 
benefits of carbon revenue for participating in carbon credit programs with a 5-year contract.  
High carbon revenue (or carbon prices) would be needed to offset these costs to stimulate 
producer participation in carbon programs.  Without considering producer private costs would 
likely lead to overestimated agricultural potential for GHG mitigation by land-based carbon 
sequestration.  Cost-sharing programs by government are needed to promote biological carbon 
sequestration on agricultural lands.   
Our analysis also found that producer perceived costs were correlated while differing 
between carbon-sequestering practices, varied across producers, and could be stratified by 
production attributes.  Accounting for the effects of production attributes, the distribution of 
producer perceived costs suggested that producer had better, consistent understanding on the 
private costs for adopting conservation tillage followed by rangeland management.  The wide 
range in producer cost perceptions for converting land to grass and tree planting might reflect 
large uncertainty in estimating the opportunity and operation costs associated with both 
practices.  In all, the distributions of these private costs demonstrated heterogeneous producer 22 
 
preferences and agricultural production, suggesting that failure to consider the heterogeneity may 
lead to unreliable estimation of the economic potential for agricultural carbon sequestration and 
its marginal costs.  
 Findings from previous studies implied that the NGP region might be the forerunner in 
the carbon offsets market if land-based biological carbon sequestration came into play (Plantinga 
et al. 2001, Antle et al. 2002).  Our simulation of producer preferences revealed potential supply 
of carbon offsets by agricultural land-based carbon sequestration in the NGP.  In this region, 
conservation tillage and rangeland management could play a major role, due to their significance 
in terms of acreage in the region.  Cropland conversion to grass and tree planting seemed more 
responsive to the carbon price, and could also contribute significantly to carbon offsets supply if 
the carbon price could reach a high level.  The NGP may provide a desirable context to explore 
agricultural carbon sequestration in a market setting.      
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Table 1.  Example of carbon credit programs by practice included in survey questionnaire
a 
Carbon credit program
b  Available carbon credits
  Market return rate 




c  0.4 metric ton/acre/year  $10/acre/year 
Cropland conversion to grass  1.0 metric ton/acre/year  $25/acre/year 
Rangeland management  0.12 metric ton/acre/year  $3/acre/year 
Tree planting
d  0.7-1.8 metric ton/acre/year
e  $17.5-45/acre/year 
a.  Carbon credit programs were adopted from the voluntary programs managed by the 
National Farmer Union (2010).  In the survey, we also included methane management.  
This study is focused on land-based carbon sequestration practices.   
b.  All programs required at least 5 year commitment. 
c.  Including planting methods commonly referred to as: no till, strip till, direct seed, zero till, 
slot till, and zone till.   
d.  A contract longer than 5 years might be required. 
e.  Credits depend on tree age and species; at least a 20 acres enrollment was required. 
f.  $25 per metric ton of carbon was assumed in this example.  
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Table 2.  Summary of producer survey response 
Attribute  Level  Percentage 
Assigned carbon price  














Carbon program participation 
 
Currently enrolled 
Not enrolled but willing to participate 
Conservation tillage 











45 years old 
46-59 years old 












Major source of household 
Income 
Farming  60% 
Education 
 
High school or less 
Technical training beyond high school 
4 year college or some college 





Attitude to climate change 
and policy 
Concerned about climate change 
Support climate policy 
44% 
18% 
























Table 3.  Stated choice distribution among carbon sequestration practices by producers willing to 
participate in carbon programs    
Carbon credit program 
Total number of carbon credit programs to enroll 
1  2  3  4 
Conservation tillage  21%  16%  11%  8% 
Cropland to grass  10%  18%  7%  8% 
Rangeland management  7%  15%  10%  8% 
Tree planting  2%  10%  7%  8% 
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Table 4.  Comparison of logit models of producer stated choice for participating in carbon credit programs 
Model  Characteristics  Simulated 
log-likelihood 
Sample prediction 
by farmer  by choice 
Model 1   Conditional logit, fixed coefficient for carbon revenue, fixed 
coefficients for program dummies  
-452.31  51.15%  77.30% 
Model 2  Conditional logit, fixed coefficient for carbon revenue, fixed 
coefficients for program dummies varying by farmer attributes with 
fixed effects  
-377.12  51.61%  79.84% 
Model 3  Conditional logit, fixed coefficient for carbon revenue varying by 
farmer attributes with fixed effects, fixed coefficients for program 
dummies varying by farmer attributes with fixed effects  
-1006.50  23.04%  64.52% 
Model 4  Mixed logit, fixed coefficient for carbon revenue, random coefficients 
for program dummies correlated and jointly normally distributed   




Model 5  Mixed logit, fixed coefficient for carbon revenue, random coefficients 
for program dummies independently and jointly normally distributed 
with population mean depending on farmer attributes with fixed 
effects 




Model 6  Mixed logit, fixed coefficient for carbon revenue, random coefficients 
for program dummies correlated and joint normally distributed  with 
population mean depending on farmer attributes with fixed effects  




Model 7  Mixed logit, fixed coefficient for carbon revenue varying by farmer 
attributes with fixed effects, random coefficients for program 
dummies correlated and jointly normally distributed  with population 
mean depending on farmer attributes with fixed effects 




Model 8  Mixed logit, random coefficient for carbon revenue truncated 
normally distributed, random coefficients for program dummies 
correlated and jointly normally distributed  with population mean 
depending on farmer attributes with fixed effects 
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Table 5.  Estimated coefficient parameters for the mixed logit model of producer stated choice of carbon credit programs
 a  
Attributes
b  Carbon revenue
c  Conservation tillage  Cropland to grass  Rangeland manage.  Tree planting 
Constant  0.0779
**(0.0391)  -3.5955      (3.1738)  -11.8706  (13.1002)  -4.3771      (3.4375)  -16.0868  (11.6830) 
Farming  -   2.2895
***  (0.6397)   1.0748      (0.9056)  -0.2029      (0.8256)   3.8181
***  (1.1382) 
CRP  -   1.2942
*     (0.7824)   1.7414
**    (0.8248)   0.3811      (0.6882)   1.1925      (0.9241) 
Rangeland   -   1.2838
*      (0.8072)   2.5727      (2.2687)   4.8513
***  (0.7565)   2.6922
***  (0.6462) 
Own land  -   1.9946
*      (1.2548)   3.4058
***  (0.9173)   1.4896      (1.4484)   2.2612
**    (1.0028) 
Rent land  -   3.5533
**    (1.5567)  -1.7252
**   (0.8582)  -0.7581
***  (0.7882)  -0.2394      (0.7482) 
Age  -  -0.1784
*     (0.0992)   0.1431      (0.2433)  -0.1197      (0.0933)  -0.1974      (0.2570) 
Years of experience  -  -0.0714      (0.1061)   0.1832      (0.4287)   0.2965
**    (0.1491)   0.1170      (0.3361) 
 College education  -   0.3085      (0.8667)   0.4606      (1.2240)  -1.0486
*     (0.6735)   2.0460     (1.5895) 
Concerned about climate  -   1.6070
**    (0.7854)   1.8640
***  (0.7504)   1.3436
*     (0.8752)  -1.0195      (1.0427) 
Support climate policy  -   1.9609
***  (0.6855)   3.2180
***  (1.1982)   1.8519
**    (0.9662)   2.1277
**  (0.9119) 
a.  Dummy variables were created for individual carbon programs to allow for preference variation regarding program 
participation depending on farmer attributes.  The dummy variable for conservation tillage is omitted with the coefficient 
estimates for the other three carbon programs representing the differences in utility relative to conservation tillage. The 
standard errors of the estimated coefficients are in parenthesis.  *** denotes significance at the 0.01 level, ** denotes 
significance at the 0.05 level, and * denotes significance at the 0.1 level. 
b.  Producer production attributes were measured by deviations from their sample averages, which were interacted with carbon 
program dummies to create independent variables incorporated in the mixed logit model.  The coefficients for the Constant 
variable represent the sample average utility across carbon programs.  The coefficients for other independent variables 
represent the marginal utility for one unit deviation in these variables from their sample averages. 
c.  Carbon revenue varies depending on the carbon program.  Based on the model comparison in Table 4, a fixed effect 
independent of producer production attributes was specified for carbon revenue across programs. 
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Table 6. Correlation between random parameters in producer choice model 
Random parameter  ConstXDtillage  ConstXDgrass  ConstXDrnglnd  ConstXDtree 
Estimated correlation for posterior distribution 
ConstXDtillage  1.0000  0.5665  0.5727  0.5771 
ConstXDgrass  0.5665  1.0000  0.5398  0.3292 
ConstXDrnglnd  0.5727  0.5398  1.0000  0.6760 
ConstXDtree  0.5771  0.3292  0.6760  1.0000 
Simulated correlation based on posterior distribution 
ConstXDtillage  1.0000  0.5563  0.5910  0.5970 
ConstXDgrass  0.5563  1.0000  0.5520  0.3309 
ConstXDrnglnd  0.5910  0.5520  1.0000  0.6760 




Table 7.  Summary of 2007 agricultural census data by states for the Northern Great Plains 
region   
Agricultural attributes  Number of farms  Acreage 
Land use and management     
   Harvested cropland  20,408  22,035,709 
   Cropland only used for pasture or grazing   4,025  778,654 
   Other cropland  17,326  4,688,627 
   Permanent pasture and rangeland  14,964  10,418,874 
   Land in conservation   15,253  3,434,047 
Land tenure     
   Own land  29,099  19,977,605 
   Rent land  15,667  19,696,981 
Principle operator age group     
   Less than or equal to 45 years    6,376  NA 
   46 to 59 years  12,707  NA 
   60 years and over  12,887  NA 
Data source: USDA (2010) 
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Table 8.  Simulated farmland enrollment in carbon credit programs by practices and carbon 
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Figure 1.  Probability distribution of sample average producer perceived private costs for 
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